If not, if we believe that in the human domain (as well as the levels beyond tactical in all domains) things are highly dependent upon context, fraught with tacit knowledge, and fall more into the art side than the science side,[xxiv] then the preferred philosophy should be the critical realist philosophy. Although this is a simplification and perhaps disingenuous, one way of thinking about the two types of domains is to imagine an armored division battle as being one largely within the land domain. [xl] Although I think it is terrible to see war in terms of three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic, I use these terms for communication purposes. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno, allegedly said recently, That is what I was missing in Iraq! Art isnt something one does while coloring within the lines and SOF shouldnt be looking for a methodology to assist us with it. "Yet no matter how much we may focus on the diversity of opinions, customs, attitudes and interests within each community, in the end it is not the diversity that defines the conflict but the conflict that defines social attitudes that are widely shared.". without the aid of references STATE the seven warfighting functions (yall should study this one hard), employment of forces in the operational area, through movement in combination with fire, Use the weapon to kill, shape the battlespace, and set conditions to be advantageous, Provides commander with understanding of the enemy and battlespace. Critical realism can be used to describe current or past situations. But, this is a great example of where using CF terminology and philosophical constructs is hurting SOF: CF submits that tactical goes up to brigade level and even possibly division. Identified change is that which results from others identifying with those wanting the change. Those always struck me as SF-light. The people who want to join the Civilian Defense movement are within their rights. Just using the comment below sets the stage for a massive exercise in critical thinking and team discussions that do not fit the standard Powerpoint MDMP presentation. So too is the buzzword "ecosystem.". This may include information from groups that are not the focus of military intelligence, such as allied forces, government agencies, and non-governmental organisations. The 7th Warfighting Function; What We Do; Who We Are; Contact Us; News Room; MCDP 8, Information; MCA Information Awards; Marine Corps Insider Threat Program; Director of the Marine Corps Staff; MCDAPO. The key is synchronizing this intelligence with other joint operations. At the same time, an integrated sustainment network would link . Its interesting that in your exchange with the detainee, he basically pointed out that part of the way they figured out their detonator problem was by going to open sources and specifically the example where the guy found a Facebook picture and post of a soldier on the soldier's Facebook page. Our adversaries are using . For the . In this book Dr. Paparone explains how the military thinks institutionally and links it to the technically rational mindset. Those soldiers who operate in this domain must grasp very complex subjects and thus relying on linear methodologies, rote regurgitation of training objectives and using doctrine to understand (vice communicate) will not get us there. The Maya existed in a network of city-states, with each ruling its immediate territory. This practitioner further learns while doing, always able to revisit assumptions due to an intellectual humbleness with respect to the world. I seriously doubt it. The American way of war places a premium on the physical aspects of conflict. Your comments gets to a larger point in my opinion- what is it, exactly, that our DoD strives for? [iii] Although I understand the argument that the domains are not separate and indeed overlap greatly as well, in addition to other arguments for or against the concept, in order to make a point I will use them in their doctrinal form. Were learning what their culture is so next time we come back in, they understand who we are, and we understand who they are. What is the Seventh WfF? It is not the silver bullet some see it as, but it is a tool to help us understand how to achieve political victory. Interestingly, I also remember a study was published that basically argued all this newfound freedom of access was being counter-productive because psychologically the soldier never really left home due to this ability to instantly communicate with those back at home on almost a daily basis. The use of this scenario in order to drive critical thinking by ODAs who are planning an UW/SW deployment is a given---it offers a massive amount of free play on the planning side as well as not being able to tie it to COIN as one cannot actually get into a clear hold and expand concept. By this I don't mean training in TTPs or organizational and topical minutia. This being, whether they know it yet or not, our young folks' generational project, which has just begun. That is, we in the Army believe, like the Political Scientist David Easton, "that in order for [military] science to become scientifically mature, it need[s] to internalize scientific principles and methods and focus on the empirically observable behavior of political actors.". I think you have made many valid points and more importantly direct personal observations based on your experiences. And, therefore, the point of our spear came to point in their direction. I would argue that we had all the understanding concerning the human factor by 2006 in literally hundreds of intelligence reports and interrogation reports---the abject failure was not on the SF side as the JSOC targeting against FF and AQI gave the CF a chance to focus their attention on the actual Sunni/Shia insurgent groups---the abject failure was the simple fact that up to even 2010 no deploying BCT fully "understood" what they were "seeing" as no one took the time inside CF to process the sheer amount of data available into a coherent training program. THEN the IED game got serious as it was the Duke vs a thinking/adapting UW team meaning once they understood jamming principles they simply starting moving the trigger away from the IED in order to figure out the jamming distance which took about ten days of real attempts to figure it out and then they were off and running again. To illustrate how the MIE multiplier might augment the guerrillas effectiveness lets take a senior Haqqani Network (HN) commander who has designs on attacking a position in or near Khost, Paktia AF. [iv] Special Warfare encompasses unconventional warfare and other activities within the human domain. The rationale being the MIE multiplier might provide more of an insight into the dynamics of the conflict ecosystem than the digitally driven lens we are currently enslaved to. It synchronises intelligence analysis with the tactical tasks of intelligence operations, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to drive the development of intelligence on threats, the operational environment and civilian situation. In U.S. doctrine there are today seven joint functions: intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, information, protec- tion, sustainment, and C2. I also don't see how managing humans, be you occupying them or sharing some skills, is a uniquely UW/SW activity. Our technical surveillance enables smart weapons which largely depend on digitized enabled surveillance. And, thereby. That's a good one. The art of Special Warfare is a creative use of special groups of professionals who are educated and trained to see things from multiple perspectives, to critically think about ones institutions flawed view of the world, create something new that is highly context-dependent across the resource spectrum, and learns while doing. This being the case, and the central problem that we face today, I am not sure how a better understanding of the human domain can help us to overcome this fundamental difficulty. Which of the following is the world's largest single trading entity? They KNOW what our political objective is and, therefore, they KNOW who is their friend and their enemy and they KNOW what kind of war they are embarked upon. The insurgents currently have the M1E which they use as effectively as they can to trip us up, now imagine the M1E further enabled with digitized surveillance and smart weapons. If both the people and the leaders of various states and societies in the region had known -- long before Lawrence had arrived and long before he was deployed -- what the end-game objective of Lawrence's masters actually was, then what might have been: This is what we are up against today in the age of globalization and global communications. I also agree with your thoughts on how we misunderstand our enemy. The intelligence warfighting function tasks facilitate the commanders visualization and understanding of the threat and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations and then counters those threats. [ii] See Stan Wiechniks excellent article, Political Legitimacy and Values in the Small Wars Journal, 17 NOV 2013, for a discussion on the importance of values within the more population-centric missions as opposed to those subjects like governance normally found within our doctrine. We must introduce at least our SOF soldiers to the concepts of the critical realist[i] philosophy and to the practice of forming multi-paradigmatic views. I submit that art has a place in war, although many of us military types are a little uncomfortable about the word. Maxwell said the War on Terrorism defined protection by entry control points, barriers, persistent ground surveillance system blimps, and even the technologically-advanced counter rocket, artillery. Coordination activities involving the civilian community may be considered within the CIMIC aspect of the IA WFF, but general engagement or engagement with the community to exert influence would more properly be considered an IA WFF aspect. The Spaniards were forced to retreat from the city, but they soon regrouped and besieged the Aztec capital. NATURE OF PLANNING o Planning as Command and Control o The Functions of Planning and Plans o Uncertainty and Time: Planning for an Unknowable Future The purpose of WFF is to provide an intellectual organisation for common critical capabilities available to commanders and staffs at all echelons and levels of warfare. Mr. White might be horrified to see his term associated with the military, as he is decidedly anti-militarism. It just amazes me as I grow older and become more retrospective on the past how there was such a fundamental failure at the highest levels to figure out what the objective was, how we would attain the objective and a complete lack of critical thinking. Domains are simply constructs for understanding a situation. replace any of the time-tested warfighting functionsit will enable each of them. For over 30 years he or one of his senior Staff will have observed the effects of any weapon system/platform we care to mention within the Khost conflict ecosystem. Those of us from the old UW days call it simply the guerrilla Darwinian principle of survival in order to fight another day or what today is called simply "staying power". The Inca Empire shared a fate similar to that of the Aztec, but at the hands of a conquistador more sinister than Cortez. What I don't like is the idea that as long as it is hard we should not try and simply leave it to others to figure out. Francisco Pizarro, motivated by legends of treasure, captured the Inca ruler Atahualpa during their first meeting. For all the efforts at "understanding the culture" of the environments we are working it failed and I mean totally failed because we did not "understand the culture of the enemy". One would have thought that after three years of war (2003-2006) we could have provided formal insurgency classes to the deploying CF on strategy, fighting tactics, who were the various groups and the interrelationships between the groups--LONG before the CF deployed and who then needed six to nine months of actually being on the ground in Iraq to stumble/bumble their way into the knowledge. Social learning-in-action would emphasize the requirement to learn while we are acting, although social entanglement (merging quantum entanglement with social efforts) might be more descriptive of the reality. How does the textbook's discussion of Anglo-American settlers in the Ohio Valley support or challenge each of the historians' arguments regarding British policy? Regardless of the constructs philosophical issues, why are Special Operations Forces (SOF) pushing for a new Army warfighting function and why is the Army supporting SOF in doing so? I agree with your assessment, the way we use technology largely replaced our use of the M1E to gain a true understanding of our operational environment, so while we have better battle field awareness on a T.V. The more conservative/anti-western reform folks -- who represent and defend the non-western way of life and way of governance of a state and society -- these folks are likely to be your natural enemies. b. There are so many different flowing themes coming out of Mexico that tangate UW and go to the heart of the discussion being pushed by Robert Bunker on the El Centro site as to the question---just what do we do with Mexico---and really the entire Central American region as the TCOs stretch that far and are destabilizing the entire region--one could actually speak of a war zone rivaling anything we have seen in the last ten years in either Iraq and or AFG. [viii] My pick would be The Sublime, but, since that might not have enough of a military sound to it, would offer social action instead in order to emphasize the social aspect as well as the requirement for action. Art, admittedly, forces one to take risk. I say for the most part because the education and personnel systems these individuals fall under are all less than desired, largely beholden to the conventional forces systems and with respect to education- are a lower priority within USSOCOM. Trusting a subordinate to plan and execute a mission objective enhances efficiency and places the U.S. at an advantage against its near-peer rivals. Virtually everyone knows what our end-game objective is. My empiricism is not the empiricism that you sometimes criticize, is it? Ignoring for a moment that viewing reality through the lens of domains is only one way- and quite possibly a very bad way- of attempting to make sense of the world, the concept of the human domain has resulted in some confusion for many within the Army and Special Operations. This approach would by definition require the philosophy behind Mission Command, it would prioritize education and training over equipment and process, it would be comfortable with a more context-focused approach to complex operations (and thus maximize flexibility while sacrificing ease of communication, funding, and planning), and it would take advantage of SOFs traditional strengths: its amazing capability at the tactical level. The memoir covers the period from about 1941 to 1973. The self, the psyche, must be involved somewhere. Doing the SF legacy mission with none of the high selectivity. Explorers may not have found the mythical golden city of El Dorado, but they did find three amazing cultures, each with unique characteristics. Without that systemic logic- the system was doomed to strategic failure. Because the underlying social rules and mechanisms are created by humans, they are constantly evolving over time and geography. Many times good intentions morph into concepts that are meant to communicate vision, but instead drive questionable acquisition and funding strategies. The mission became one of democratization. Its SOF opposite, Special Warfare, is usually associated with Unconventional Warfare and COIN, but in truth includes those operations of long duration and limited footprint wherein a politically sensitive situation precludes a large foreign force on the ground. The purpose of CIMIC is to coordinate with and support the various non-military elements of the operating environment. Can you imagine the reaction of the Indian authorities if you suggested they study Pakistani Punjab village culture in order to counter a repeat of the attack on the Taj Hotel and VT. Who says that a "human domain" warfighting function would solely be the domain of SF? What keeps them in the fight is they are observant and patient and both of those come free. Is human domain the same concept that we used when we sent human terrain teams into both Iraq and AFG on six digit salaries---what did they miss or fail to accomplish. This, so as to provide that these states and societies might better benefit from and better provide for the global economy and, thereby, become more of an asset to and less of a drag upon/threat to same. Small Wars Journal is published by Small Wars Foundation - a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation. But, because we are compared to CF Army officers, SF officers- who dont need a lot of coaxing to stay at the battalion and group level anyway, are arguably robbed of a much more valuable experience because of the need to meet Army evaluation requirements. And one can use art, I'd argue, to re-imagine one's mission- all the while not straying too far outside of one's constraints. In some aspects the Civilian Defense groups are forcing the military and federal police to start offenses against some of the TCOs but it should be noted that the military and federal police have been are to a degree also corrupted by the TCOs. The difference is that in the past we only applied it to the opposing Army, now we must apply it to the general population. 2. peterborough vs cardiff forebet; blake school uniforms; bacterial speck vs bacterial spot All warfighting functions possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects. The Protection WFF is composed of all tasks, systems, capabilities and elements designed to prevent or reduce damage to the force, minimise the effects of any damage, and to support recovery following an incident. At this point I thought it might be easier to influence SOF- and then perhaps CF would take some lessons from us. Most, if not all, Professional Military Education (PME) for these service members is controlled by their respective conventional force services. You and I are not using logical in the same way, your use of the word seems to be more rigid than mine, probably because I make things up and don't worry too much about formal definitions. RantCorp--now you understand the reason why we lost Iraq and AFG. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. The primary purpose of the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating then other elements of combat power (leadership, information, M2, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection) to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. IO is not a discrete, stand alone capability but is the integrated, coordinated, and synchronized operational application of all information-related capabilities (IRCs) 5, both organic and non-1 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting, 20 June . The role of information in future conflicts is becoming exceedingly important given the explosive rise of information technology. Why assume that the SF/SOF community does not appreciate its "pred" and other feeds in conducting night raids and more typical pattern of life? Thru the same lens they would have recognized what events indicate discipline and control and what events reflect anxiety, panic, fear and hysteria. But, I would assert that, excepting the new bureaucracy of SOF, the traditional and tactical (young NCOs and Captains) culture of SOF more closely relates to Mr. Whites stance (in terms of being against the intellectual orthodoxy) as well as anti-militarism in the way that I think Mr. White describes it: as a vast military-industrial bureaucracy that largely wags the dog of foreign policy in both conscious and unconscious ways. It accomplishes this by supporting the force to ensure it has the capacity to act and continue to act until successful achievement of the mission. This is distinct from a highly skilled practitioner of a set of skills (I.e. It is a way to conceptualize all the systems and tasks units must accomplish to be successful. [xxviii] USASOC, ARSOF 2022, http://www.specialoperations.org/ARSOF2022_vFINAL%5B1%5D.pdf. 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